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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE np UT'AH 
Plaintiff/Appe1Iee, 
WENDELL MAVANICK, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 981398-CA 
Priority No. 1 5 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REHEARING 
Should the Court's written opinion be amended to reflect the 
fact that Appellant did JI it concede the validity of the arrest 
warrant leading to the contested search of his peiscwi wli^i^ 
Appellant specifically argued against the validity of the warrant 
in the trial coui t, and did not 
deviate from this position curing oral argument Joercre Unit" 
Cour\ V 
RELIEF REQUESTED 
Appellant respectfully requests this Court to amend it's 
opinion to corre:., : L •• • • • • .-he did not concede the 
validity of the arrest warrant underlying the arrest and 
contested search in this matter. 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE: THIS COURT SHOULD AMEND ITS OPINION TO CORRECTLY 
REFLECT THE FACT THAT APPELLANT DOES NOT CONCEDE THE 
VALIDITY OF THE ARREST WARRANT UNDERLYING THE SEARCH 
THAT HE CHALLENGED ON APPEAL. 
Pursuant n i n ',» i w J iin> ntriti Rules of Appellate 
Procedure (199.9 », 3 rehearing is merited in Lliis Uourt wh^ tn- Llie 
court has overlooked or misapprehended" the law or facts of a 
case in issuing a decision. A rehearing is merited in the 
present case because the Court "overlooked or misapprehended" the 
fact that Appellant Wendell Navanick ("Navanick") did not concede 
the validity of the arrest warrant that led to his arrest and the 
subsequent search contested on appeal. Id. 
After full briefing and oral argument concerning the 
legality of the jailhouse search of Navanick, this Court issued 
an opinion (for official publication) affirming the lower court's 
denial of Navanick's motion to suppress evidence seized incident 
to that search in violation of his Fourth Amendment right against 
unreasonable search and seizure. See State v. Navanick 1999 UT 
App. 265 (September 23, 1999) (included in Addendum A). In that 
opinion, the Court stated, " [b]ecause it is conceded that the 
officers in this case were acting pursuant to a valid arrest 
warrant, the only issue before this court is whether the police 
acted reasonably under the circumstances in arresting defendant." 
Id. at 3. 
In writing the Navanick opinion, the Court "overlooked" the 
fact that Navanick has not conceded the warrant's validity at any 
point in the criminal proceeding against him. Utah R. App. P. 
35(a). First, Navanick asserted in the trial court that the 
warrant did not meet the particularity requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment to the extent that "[the warrant] didn't truly name him 
or particularly describe him in that it had a different spelling 
of the name [and] had [a] different birthdate." Record for 
2 
Appeal ("R.") at 290 [89] ; see also Addendum B (relevant text of 
suppression hearing). 
Again in his opening brief ("A.B."), footnote 5, Navanick 
challenged the validity of the warrant without equivocation. See 
A.B.10-11 n.5; see also Addendum C (text of footnote 5 from 
Appellant's Opening Brief). Navanick wrote in his brief: "The 
trial court found that the [arrest] warrant was valid. R.137. 
Navanick, however, does not concede its validity." A.B.10-11 
n.5. He then discussed at length how the warrant fails to meet 
the particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment under 
applicable case law. Id. Navanick restated the challenge to the 
validity of the arrest warrant in his reply brief ("R.B."). See 
R.B.I (answering state's preservation challenge regarding his 
argument about the invalid arrest warrant); see also Addendum D 
(relevant text of Appellant's Reply Brief). 
Navanick did not deviate from his stance regarding the 
invalid warrant during oral argument, held August 19, 1999, 
either. In the interests of time, Navanick did not discuss the 
invalidity of the warrant during his opening, choosing instead to 
use his allotted time to address why the officers did not act 
reasonably under the circumstances in arresting Navanick. See 
Tape No. 526 (Side B) (audio recording of oral argument). This, 
however, does not amount to a concession that the warrant was 
valid. Indeed, even the State recognized that Navanick continued 
to contest the validity of the warrant to the extent that it 
acknowledged his argument in his opening brief, then proceeded to 
3 
argue points to the contrary in support of the validity. Id. 
Given the repeated challenges to the validity of the arrest 
warrant, and the fact that Navanick did not deviate from this 
position during oral argument, this case merits a rehearing where 
the Court "overlooked or misapprehended," Utah R. App. P. 35(a), 
this fact in writing its opinion, stating instead that the 
validity of the warrant was "conceded." Navanick, 1999 UT App. 
265 at 3. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, Navanick respectfully requests 
this Court to amend its opinion to reflect the fact that he does 
not concede the validity of the arrest warrant leading to his 
arrest and the subsequent search challenged on appeal. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
h # 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Wendell Navanick, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
FILED 
SEP 2 3 1999 
COURT OF APPEALS 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 981398-CA 
F I L E D 
(September 23, 1999) 
1999 UT App 265 
Third District, Salt Lake Department 
The Honorable Tyrone Medley 
Attorneys: Ralph Dellapiana and Catherine E. Lilly, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellant 
Jan Graham and Laura B. Dupaix, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellee 
Before Judges Greenwood, Billings, and Davis. 
GREENWOOD, Associate Presiding Judge: 
111 Defendant Wendell Navanick appeals from his conviction for 
possession of a controlled substance, claiming the trial court 
erred in denying his motion to exclude methamphetamine seized 
during a jailhouse search. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
12 On July 3, 1997, Officer Bryan Bailey received a call from 
the manager of Motel 6 on 600 South Street in Salt Lake City, 
Utah. The hotel manager reported she suspected a guest at the 
motel registered under the name of Wendell Navanick was engaged 
in "pimping." After learning an arrest warrant had been issued 
for Wendell Navanick, Officer Bailey contacted Officer Mitchell, 
told him about the phone call from the motel manager, and 
instructed him to go to Motel 6 to execute the arrest warrant. 
13 Officer Mitchell contacted dispatch and was informed that 
Wendell Navanick, birth date 11-21-71, had an outstanding arrest 
warrant for phone harassment issued from West Valley City. 
Officer Mitchell also checked the Salt Lake City Police 
Department's records, which included Wendell Navanick with a 
Lc*<^ ikiUi 
birth date of 11-27-71 and an alias birth date of 1-7-71. The 
records indicated that both birth dates were associated with the 
same address. The records, however, did not include a physical 
description of Wendell Navanick, and Officer Mitchell did not 
call the West Valley City Police Department to obtain a physical 
description of the arrestee. 
1[4 Officer Mitchell, Detective Hatch, and Officer Ewell then 
went to Motel 6 and knocked on the door of the room registered to 
Wendell Navanick. When the door opened, Detective Hatch 
recognized the man inside as Wendell Navanick because of a prior 
contact. Mitchell then asked defendant for his name and birth 
date. Defendant said he was Wendell Navanick and that his birth 
date was 1-7-71. Mitchell then told defendant there was a 
warrant for his arrest for phone harassment. Although defendant 
seemed confused and told the officers that he was not the same 
Wendell Navanick as the one listed on the warrant,1 Officer 
Mitchell did not believe him and took defendant into custody.2 
K5 At the Salt Lake City Jail, the jailer found methamphetamine 
on defendant during a routine booking search. While Mitchell was 
entering the charge of possession of a controlled substance into 
the computer, the jailer told Mitchell that he knew of two 
Wendell Navanicks and that defendant might not be the one listed 
on the warrant.3 
16 At trial, defendant moved to suppress the methamphetamine 
found during the search on the basis that the search violated his 
Fourth Amendment rights because it was predicated upon an invalid 
arrest. The trial court denied defendant's motion. Defendant 
subsequently pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine, and 
received a one year sentence in the Salt Lake County Jail and 
three years probation. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
f7 Defendant argues the trial court erred in concluding his 
arrest was valid and in denying his motion to suppress the 
methamphetamine seized during the booking search. "In reviewing 
a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we will 
1. Defendant's legal name is John Gutierrez. 
2. The only basis for the arrest of defendant was the warrant. 
3. The State does not dispute defendant's assertion that there 
are at least two persons named Wendell Navanick in the Salt Lake 
City area and that the arrest warrant was issued for the other 
Wendell Navanick. 
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not overturn the trial court's factual findings absent clear 
error." State v. Betha, 957 P.2d 611, 614 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
(citing State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah Ct- App. 1991). 
The trial court's legal conclusions, however, we review for 
correctness. See id. 
ANALYSIS 
18 Defendant argues the arresting officers violated his Fourth 
Amendment4 rights by failing to verify whether defendant was the 
person listed on the warrant before arresting him. The State 
counters that the officers acted reasonably under the 
circumstances in arresting defendant. 
1|9 When a person is mistakenly arrested pursuant to a valid 
arrest warrant, the arrest and subsequent seizure of evidence is 
valid only if: (1) probable cause existed for the arrest;5 and 
(2) the police reasonably, and in good faith, believe the suspect 
is the intended arrestee. See Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797., 
802, 91 S. Ct. 1106, 1109 (1971). Because it is conceded that 
the officers in this case were acting pursuant to a valid arrest 
warrant, the only issue before this court is whether the police 
acted reasonably under the circumstances in arresting defendant. 
See Gero v. Hanault, 740 F.2d 78, 84-85 (1st Cir. 1984) (!f [W] here 
there is a facially valid warrant or probable cause for arrest, 
. . . the only question is whether it was reasonable for the 
arresting officers to believe that the person arrested was the 
one sought."). Although Hill and its progeny provide guidance on 
the question of whether officers acted reasonably in arresting 
defendant, "whether a police officer reasonably believes an 
arrested and a sought individual to be the same often entails a 
highly factual inquiry." Brown v. Patterson, No. 85 C 6859, 1986 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20961, at *12 (N.D. 111. Aug. 29, 1986). 
Furthermore, "the reasonableness of the officers1 belief must be 
determined by the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
arrest." Id. at *3. 
1l0 In Hill, the Supreme Court held that the mistaken arrest of 
a person other than the person sought under the warrant was 
reasonable because the person arrested was found at the address 
on the warrant and matched a description of the arrestee. See 
Hill. 401 U.S. at 803, 91 S. Ct. at 1110. Other courts following 
4. Defendant's arguments on appeal are limited to the Federal 
Constitution. 
5. At oral argument, defendant abandoned his claim asserted in 
his brief that a misspelling of the name on the arrest warrant 
rendered it invalid. We therefore do not address this claim. 
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Hill have held that a mistaken arrest is reasonable when it is 
based on other information separately justifying the arrest. 
See, e.g., State v. Green, 723 A.2d 1012, 1013 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1999) (holding arrest of wrong person justified where 
description of intended arrestee matched appearance of man 
arrested); Sanders v. United States, 339 A.2d 373, 375, 379 (D.C. 
Ct. App. 1975) (holding arrest of man whose identification and 
description matched that of intended arrestee valid). In this 
case, defendant maintained when he was arrested that he was not 
the person listed on the warrant. Protestations of mistaken 
identity and innocence are common during an arrest, however, and 
such assertions do not necessarily obligate an arresting officer 
to verify the suspect's identity before making an arrest. See 
Hill, 401 U.S. at 802-03, 91 S. Ct. at 1110 (noting aliases and 
false identifications are not uncommon); cf. Haynes v. Chicago, 
No. 95 C 7205, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5294, at *10 (N.D. 111. 
April 17, 1996) (dismissing section 1983 claim and stating in 
case of mistaken identity, "arresting officer is not obligated 
. . . to 'investigate independently every claim of innocence,' 
including mistaken identity.") (citation omitted). 
Ull Courts have held mistaken arrests valid when police 
reasonably believed the suspect was the intended arrestee. For 
example, in Sanders, the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia addressed the validity of an arrest where police 
approached a suspect who, when asked for identification, 
"produced an identification card on which his last name was 
misspelled as Saunders (rather than Sanders) ." Sanders, 339 A.2d 
at 375. The officer then discovered an outstanding warrant for 
the arrest of Robert Saunders whose description matched the 
defendant. See id. When the arresting officer asked the 
defendant if he had ever been incarcerated in Arlington County, 
Virginia, where the arrest warrant was issued, defendant 
responded that he had. See id. Police then arrested and 
searched the defendant, finding illegal weapons and ammunition. 
See id. Officers later discovered the warrant was issued for the 
arrest of someone other than defendant. See id. 
Kl2 Defendant moved to suppress the weapons and ammunition, 
arguing the evidence was obtained pursuant to an invalid arrest. 
Relying on Hill, the appellate court noted: 
Should doubt as to the correct identity of 
the subject of warrant arise, the arresting 
officer obviously should make immediate 
reasonable efforts to confirm or deny the 
applicability of the warrant to the detained 
individual. If, after such reasonable 
efforts, the officer reasonably and in good 
faith believes that the suspect is the one 
against whom the warrant is outstanding, a 
981398-CA 4 
[search] pursuant to the arrest of that 
person is not in contravention of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Id. at 379. Because the police had no reason to believe that 
defendant was anyone other than the arrestee listed on the 
warrant, the court held n,on the record before us the officers' 
mistake was understandable and the arrest a reasonable response 
to the situation facing them at the time.1" Id. (quoting Hill, 
401 U.S. at 804, 91 S. Ct. at 1111). "The evidence seized 
incident to the arrest properly was admitted into evidence." Id. 
Hl3 Similarly, in Green, the New Jersey Superior Court addressed 
the issue of whether the mistaken arrest of a man whose 
appearance was "dramatically similar" to that of the person 
sought under the warrant was valid. Green, 723 A.2d at 1013. 
The court held that because the defendant was found at the house 
listed on the warrant and resembled the description of the 
arrestee, "the arresting officer had a reasonable belief" he 
was arresting the correct person. Id. 
1l4 The circumstances of the arrest in this case lead us to 
conclude that the officers acted reasonably in arresting 
defendant. The unchallenged findings of fact, upon which the 
trial court based its denial of defendant's motion to suppress 
support this conclusion. These findings include the following: 
4. On July 3, 1997, while on duty, Salt Lake 
City Police Detective Bryan Bailey received a 
telephone call from the manager of a Motel 6 
in Salt Lake City reporting suspicious 
activity in room 148. 
5. The manager told the police that a 
"Wendell Navanick" was registered in room 
148. 
7. Detective Mitchell called police dispatch 
by telephone and asked them to check the name 
"Wendell Navanick" for warrants. 
8. The dispatcher informed Detective 
Mitchell that there was a warrant for a 
person with that name and the date of birth 
of 11/27/71. 
9. An arrest warrant for "Wendall Navanick" 
with an address of "1985 South 200 East, SLC, 
UT 84115," date of birth "11/27/71," on a 
981398-CA 5 
charge of telephone harassment was signed by-
Judge Judith Atherton, Third District Court, 
West Valley Department, on May 7, 1997. 
11. No physical description was provided on 
the warrant. 
12. Detective Mitchell checked the police 
department's computerized records and 
determined that there were two dates of birth 
associated with the name Wendell Navanick, 
11/27/71, and an alias date of 1/7/71. 
15. The man inside [room 148] was identified 
as the defendant, Wendell Navanick. 
16. An officer accompanying Detective 
Mitchell recognized the man in room 148 as 
Wendell Navanick. 
17. Defendant told Detective Mitchell that 
his date of birth was 1/7/71, which was 
consistent with the information that 
Detective Mitchell had obtained from police 
records. 
18 . Defendant was informed of the warrant 
and denied that he was the person named in 
the warrant. 
19. Defendant's testimony was not credible. 
20. Defendant had no identification to show 
to the police. 
21. Although "Wendell Navanick" is an 
uncommon name, at least two persons by that 
name, including the defendant, have been 
booked into the Salt Lake County jail. 
22 . Defendant had used names other than 
Wendell Navanick in the past. 
23. Detective Mitchell stated that suspects 
often gave him false names and dates of 
birth. 
981398-CA 6 
Ul5 The officers in this case had a reasonable basis to believe 
they were arresting the correct person. Furthermore, the trial 
court's findings — to which we defer--support its denial of 
defendant's motion to suppress. We therefore conclude that, 
under the circumstances, the officers acted reasonably in 
arresting defendant. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's 
denial of defendant's motion to suppress and his conviction for 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance. 
CONCLUSION 
1l6 When police mistakenly arrest a suspect pursuant to an 
arrest warrant for a different person, the arrest and subsequent 
search is valid only if: (1) the officers have probable cause to 
arrest the suspect; and (2) the officers, in good faith, 
reasonably believe the person they arrest is the person sought 
under the warrant. In this case, the police were acting pursuant 
to a valid arrest warrant for telephone harassment supported by 
probable cause. Furthermore, officers acted reasonably in 
arresting defendant when the motel manager informed officers that 
Wendell Navanick was registered in room 148, one of the arresting 
officers recognized defendant as Wendell Navanick, defendant had 
no identification and gave information consistent with that 
listed on the warrant, Wendell Navanick is an uncommon name, 
defendant's testimony was not credible, and because suspects 
often give police officers false information in an attempt to 
avoid arrest. Thus, we conclude the trial court did not err in 
denying defendant's motion to suppress and affirm his conviction 
for possession of a controlled substance. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
H17 WE CONCUR 
n 
Kfudith-- Mv*Billings, Judge 
^ £ w 
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ADDENDUM B 
V) vA> 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL Df^ltaCgfc/ 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * 
The State of Utah 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Wendell Navanick 
Transcript of: 
Motion Hearing 
Case No. 971015158 
Defendant. 
The above entitled cause of action came on 
regularly for hearing before the Honorable 
Tyrone E. Medley, a Judge of the Third District Court 
of the State of Utah, at Salt Lake County, Utah, on 
Tuesday, February 17, 1998 and Friday, February 20, 1998 
Appearances 
For the Plaintiff Nick Dalesandro 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
For the Defendant: 
pass MSTSicy zmz? 
Third Judicial District 
MAR 2 7 1998 
LT LAKE COur, i Y 
-*x 5£LT LArvE C uis 
Ralph Dellapiana 
Legal Defender Association 
424 East 500 South 
Salt Laki3tttT7-Atah 'flCEfif 
0 C ? 13 1998 
^"aO'Aiesandro 
c,erk of the Court 
Deputy Clerk 
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1 motion hearing, it was essentially undisputed that he 
2 is not the person named in the warrant. This was a 
3 warrantless arrest. Certainly he wasn't booked on a 
4 warrant. At least, I think we have presented 
5 evidence to that effect. And so it is the simplest 
6 type of a case and shouldn't have, in view, come this 
7 far at all. This is a warrant. What of the warrant? 
8 How does it apply at all? It is our position that 
9 this warrant, I mean other than the obvious and 
10 undisputed fact that it wasn't for this defendant, 
11 which I think is dispositive, it didn't truly name 
12 him or particularly describe him in that it had a 
13 different spelling of the name, had different 
14 birthdate. Mr. Navanick testified he has never given 
15 a different birthdate, but then what is the standard. 
16 Let me address this. It is the State's position 
17 that the statutory standard of 77-7-11 applies that 
18 an officer can make an arrest. I think that our 
19 position is that this is a constitutional issue. 
20 Perhaps that provision of the statute would protect 
21 the officer against a tort claim for false arrest. 
22 It doesn't change the constitutional standard. I 
23 cannot. I am reminded of the State vs. Mendoza case 
24 where the legislature tried to legislately impose a 
25 good faith exception to the warrant requirement in 
ADDENDUM C 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE 
WENDELL NAVANICK, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 981398-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from = adgment : _^..\ _ct-.o:: I-. ... 
Possession/Use of a Controlled Substance a third degree felony, 
Ov-4,Ot_i.s___.Cl_i_ ._• -. O s_ -w ». 
- .. *- v ... .«:_.v, . w0.^.1 -UAC Jounty, 
State jf Utah, che Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, Judge, presiding. 
CATHERINE L. BEGIC (#7746) 
RALPH W. DELLAPIANA (#6861) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC, 
424 E. 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
JAN GRAHAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 E. 300 South, 6th Fl 
P. 0. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah S4-14 ZSiA 
Attorney for Appellee 
satisfied. The question then becomes "whether it was reasonable 
for the arresting officers to believe that the person arrested 
was the one sought." Gero v. Henault, 74 0 F.2d 78, 84-85 (1st 
Cir. 1984) (citing Hill, 401 U.S. at 804) .5 As explained by the 
5
 The trial court found that the warrant was valid. R.137. 
Navanick, however, does not concede its validity. A valid warrant 
under the Fourth Amendment must particularly describe the person to 
be arrested. See West v. Cabell, 153 U.S. 78, 14 S. Ct. 752, 38 
L.Ed. 643 (1894). Whether a warrant meets the particularity 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment "depends upon the particular 
circumstances" of each case. State v. Mclntire, 768 P. 2d 970, 972 
(Utah App. 1989) (discussing particularity requirements for search 
warrants) (citing State v. Anderson, 701 P. 2d 1099, 1102 (Utah 
1985)) . Generally, a warrant that correctly names the arrestee is 
adequate. See Powe v. City of Chicago, 664 F.2d 639, 645 (7th Cir. 
1981) . However, a warrant that incorrectly names the subject is 
not valid unless accompanying affidavits provide additional 
information that clarifies his or her identity. Id. 
In the present case, the warrant did not correctly name the 
arrestee to the extent that it misspelled the name as "Wendall 
Navanick;" the correct spelling is "Wendell." R.191. Moreover, 
the warrant was not accompanied by any information, such as an 
affidavit, that could cure the deficit in information identifying 
the subject of the warrant. Id. Although the warrant itself 
provided a birth date and address, as discussed herein, neither 
piece of information conformed to other information obtained by the 
officer (i.e. - Mitchell was sent to a different address than the 
one listed on the warrant, R.290[9,13,15] , and the birth date was 
contradicted by another one indicated in a record referenced by 
Mitchell, R.290 [16-18]) . Accordingly, under the circumstances, the 
warrant did not adequately describe the arrestee with sufficient 
particularity to satisfy the Fourth Amendment. 
As noted in Sanders v. United States, 339 A.2d 373 (D.C. App. 
1975), where, as in the present case, 
an agent of the state makes an arrest pursuant to a warrant 
(assuming no independent probable cause), and the warrant 
fails, the arrest also must fail, for the agent's authority to 
make a proper arrest dies with the warrant. Good faith or 
reasonableness on the part of the arresting officer cannot 
remedy such an infirmity. 
Id. at 377 (citing Hill, 401 U.S. at 804) . The arrest at issue 
here fails since the warrant is invalid and Mitchell, as he himself 
admitted, did not have probable cause to arrest Navanick that 
existed independently of the warrant. R.290 [30]. Furthermore, 
even assuming Mitchell exercised good faith in executing this 
10 
Hill Court, "sufficient probability; not certaint} ' the 
t : .i icl :i st- one c 'f :i : = asonableness under the Foi irt h Amendmen-
ts c it 8 03 Moreover , reasonableness is assessec L.I lignt 
the totality of the circumstances. Id.6 
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officers acted reasonably when they arrested a person mistaken 
f o r petitioner Hill and seized evidence in a search incident to 
arrest, such would not be enough for the arrest to survive the 
Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable search and 
seizure; Mitchell's "authority to make a proper arrest die[d] with 
the warrant." Sanders, 33 9 A.2d at 3 77 
In addition to the foregoing, another aspect of this case 
undermines the validity of Navanick's arrest. In United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S 89 7, 104 S. Ct : 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), the 
Supreme Court established the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule, upholding the admissibility of evidence seized 
as a result of an officer's reasonable reliance upon a search 
warrant that later turned out to be invalid. 468 U.S. at 925-26. 
In so holding, however, the Court expressly noted that the 
exception would not apply where a "warrant [is] so facially 
deficient - i.e., in failing to particularize the place [or person] 
to be searched or the things to be seized - that the executing 
officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid." Id. at 923. 
The hypothetical scenario envisioned by the Leon Court is the 
reality in the present case. Under the circumstances here and for 
reasons discussed above, the information provided in the warrant is 
"facially deficient" in that it fails to "particularize" the person 
to be arrested. Id. Hence, Mitchell could not "reasonably presume 
it to be valid." In acting on an obviously deficient warrant, 
Mitchell did not exercise good faith, and therefore the 
exclusionary rule applies to this case. Id. at 925-26. 
Yet, even assuming the validity of the warrant and/or 
Mitchell's good faith reliance thereon, the arrest is still illegal 
under the Fourth Amendment given the unreasonableness of the 
mistaken arrest of Navanick. See discussion infra. 
6
 "Totality of the circumstances" includes assessment of such 
factors as the "adequacy of the description of the suspect, time 
and place of arrest, and [the arresting officer's] action in the 
period immediately following the arrest", United States v. Valez, 
796 F.2d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1986), and the particular exigencies of the 
s i t uat ion. See, e.g. , United States v. Marshall, 7 9 F . 3 d 68, 6 9 
(3d Cir. 1996). 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
WENDELL NAVANICK, : Case No. 981398-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE: NAVANICK PROPERLY PRESERVED HIS ARGUMENT FOR APPEAL 
AND HIS ARGUMENTS HAVE RECORD SUPPORT. 
The State contends that Appellant Wendell Navanick 
("Navanick") did not preserve his arguments on appeal in two 
respects. See State's Brief ("S.B.") at n.6, n.8. First, the 
State asserts that Navanick's discussion of the facial validity 
of the warrant was not preserved to the extent that the exact 
points he challenges on appeal were not articulated to the trial 
court below. S.B. n.5. The State is incorrect. 
In his opening brief, Navanick asserts that the warrant does 
not meet the particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment 
on the basis that the subject's name was misspelled and that the 
birth date and address listed on the warrant were different or 
contradicted by other information possessed by Officer Mitchell. 
See Appellant's Brief ("A.B.") at n.6. These same grounds were 
articulated by defense counsel to the trial court when he stated: 
11
 [the warrant] didn't truly name him or particularly describe him 
in that it had a different spelling of the name [and] had [a] 
different birthdate." R.290[89]. Hence, contrary to the State's 
assertion, the issue was adequately preserved for appeal. 
